This Dump Is A Puzzle

reconstructing j2me firmware from an unknown file system



Overview

- A little bit of back story
- An interesting problem appearing
- The path I took to solving it
- Some upper bounds on efficacy of my approach



Introductions

- Security consultant at NCC Group for the last 2.5 years
- Prior hobbyist background
- Heavily multiclassed hacker
 - Appsec
 - Hardware
 - Amateur Radio
 - Some crypto/maths
 - Some RevEng (obviously)



Once upon a time

- Investigating an IoT gateway device.
- Chipset based on running J2 Micro Edition midlets on some proprietary JVM/OS.
- Device bridges LPWAN -> GSM/Private APN
- Usual boring unsecured debug serial pwnage.
- Obviously can't just stop there!



• Have an eSIM on the board




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- Wanted: direct APN access for back end systems!



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- Desoldered the eSIM




- Have an eSIM on the board
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- Desoldered the eSIM
- Super janky kludge onto a cheap mobile GSM dongle
 - Three prayers of contrition to the gods of EMC compatibility.
 - I'm genuinely very sorry.





Cursed image!

- Have an eSIM on the board
- Wanted: direct APN access for back end systems!
- Desoldered the eSIM
- Super janky kludge onto a cheap mobile GSM modem
 - Three prayers of contrition to the gods of EMC compatibility.
 - I'm genuinely very sorry.
- Still need APN config/creds to connect





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- Abusing the pwned java environment?
- Extract the eSIM data?
- Used a logic analyser with an ad hoc IEC 7816 parser to MITM bus traffic between the SIM and the board and see what turned up
- Dump the chip and dig through that? Sure!
 - Can see fragmented file chunks
 - Including Zip file fragments found our J2ME data!



Chip dump investigation

- They can't simply be extracted!
- Can see unidentifiable proprietary file system
- Data all looks like regular-sized pages
- Can't find a page table anywhere
 - Or anything that looks even like offsets from the start of the file data



Just binwalking it



Which leads to the inspiration for this piece of research:

- Zip files have a lot of internal structure/metadata/self-reference
- Maybe I don't have to care that I've got no page table
- Treat the dump as a set of shuffled puzzle pieces
- Find clues in the metadata to match pieces to their appropriate locations.
- Why not write a puzzle solver (a completely absurd shotgun parser) to help reorder the pieces into coherent data?




Fragmented Decompression

- Compression algorithms (including DEFLATE) use tightly packed bitstreams
- Not completely structureless
- However: This structure is mostly incoherent without context
 - It's difficult to tell whether any given set of bits are a bit-packed fragment header, a byte code for a stored pattern to expand, or part of a literal data string.
 - Decompression depends on the compression state machine being in the right state for each bit being processed, which also depends on previous bits processed.
- Using Binwalk to do generic "unpack DEFLATE streams" results in completely irrational output on fragmented/disordered data
 - In my case, a very small dump unpacks unboundedly, eating up all the spare disk space (many gigabytes!) before crashing, while losing the associated zip file metadata
- TLDR: Decompression requires that the compressed blob is intact.
 - Or at least, considerably increased complexity determining sufficient context to recover it e.g.: http://blog.ptsecurity.com/2017/12/huffman-tables-intel-me.html




Brief intro to Zip files

- Thanks to Ange Albertini's Corkami project producing diagrams which helped a lot with the intuition for this!
- Zip files exhibit a three level hierarchy.
- End of CD header points to the Central Directory
- Central directory points to Local File Headers
- LFHs are directly followed by associated data



CC-BY Ange Albertini, excerpt from https://github.com/corkami/pics







Characterising a dump

- Skim through dump
- Page boundaries (and multiples of that are fairly clear at a glance in a hex editor.
- Good idea of how large our "puzzle pieces" are
- Can use this as the basic unit for reconstructing our files

0x00080380	4545	4444	****	****	****	6688	6666	6666	****	****		****	****	****	****	6666
0x000803a0																****
0x000803c0																+ + + + +
0x000803e0																6666
0x00080400	foff	forf	foff	for	forf	forf	foff	foff								****
0x00080420	foff	foff	foff	f0fc	foff	foff	foff	foff								****
0x00080440	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								
0x00080440	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								6466
0x00080480	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								****
0x000804a0	foff	forf	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								6666
0x000804c0	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								6666
0x000804e0	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								6466
0x00080500	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								6666
0x00080520	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								****
0x00080540	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								++++
0x00080560	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								++++
0x00080580	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								****
0x000805a0	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								++++
0x000805c0	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								ffff
0x000805e0	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								ffff
0x00080600	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								ffff
0x00080620	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								ffff
0x00080640	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff	foff								ffff
0x00080660																ffff
0x00080680																ffff
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0x000806e0																ffff
0x00080700																ffff
0×00080720																ffff
0×00080740																ffff
0x00080760																ffff
0×00080780																ffff
0x000807a0					f0ff											ffff
0x000807c0																ffff
0x000807e0				foff												ffff
0×00080800	9518	eee0	8a80	aa19	2ddd	6e9a	755f	754d	dd63	55d2	2c5b	1388	685d	c7f5	34ab	47fa
0x00080820	587a	aad4	d6ef	e9f9	0ed1	f355	cfb5	есеб			1629	23e9	a935	0a4c		8a02
0x00080840	2912	2fb0	17ef	361a	a63b	1790	881b	2671	bbe8	4bdf	9e4d		6733	6f58	b667	ba96
0x00080860	63e7	dbae	9127	cfa6	6ed7	7bf9	96ee	d6b7	74d7	ccdf	5829	d4ae	7a85	cd7a	ad5a	a82c
0x00080880	97e6	82e0	6cfa	c5d3	fdcb	1192	87d1	294d	3ceb	74ea	35cb	a9dd		774d	6d9e	
0x000808a0	972b	da7e	1b02	574b	efed	b72c cfb4	a72d	995b	817b	9688	f225	cbb6		aaaf	e0d4	4d01
0x000808c0	41b5	1d29 d79a	da15		593d 9ed6		4057 0eef	e0ec	7f4c		8c32	9df3	e2ff	6a89	8056	
0x000808e0 0x00080900	9653 5cac	d79a d3be	a657 e9aa	blec	ald4	d0ad 0f6d			be61 afa5	763d 594e	ca24	305a	717a 0db3	16ab 43ae	9ad3	f0e7
		d3be	e9aa	b349		21d5	cb75	182d 11b5		594e					5587	4ba2 2bc4
0x00080920	fb52	15/4	6346	2861	u245	2105	2222	1105	1005	0098	4003	aboe	ael4	0480	e392	2004



Where do we start?

End of Central Directory gives us:

- The final record in a zip file
 - Happens only once!
- Total size of file headers + data
- Total number of file entries to expect
- Size of Central Directory
- Easily identifiable magic signature PK\x05\x06

End of central dir record: end of central dir signature 4 bytes (0x06054b50) number of this disk 2 bytes number of the disk with the start of the central directory 2 bytes total number of entries in the central dir on this disk 2 bytes total number of entries in the central dir 2 bytes size of the central directory 4 bytes offset of start of central directory with respect to the starting disk number 4 bytes zipfile comment length 2 bytes zipfile comment (variable size)



First complication

```
[0x00080760]> / PK\x05\x06
Searching 4 bytes in [0x0-0xb00000]
hits: 2
0x0076c549 hit1_0 .kon.classPK\u0005\u0006m.
0x00a9d4b6 hit1_1 .:zz.classPK\u0005\u0006ff3.
[0x00080760]>
```

Two instances in the dump

- Pointer data in zip files is only usable if we can tell which one it's from
- Need to be able to classify fragments before reordering them
- Reading the header data indicates ~ 2000 entries between them
 - Problematic number of entries to be reviewing manually for classification.
- Trying to solve this puzzle solving problem as generally as possible (not just pick out classifiers for one particular dump)



Automating classification

Looking at potential classification criteria in the headers that we can use to sort the records into a collection for each expected file:

- Version data (OS and software-stack indicators)
- Compression flags
- Compression method
- Timestamp (presuming midlets not compiled simultaneously!)

File header:

central file header signature	4 bytes	(0x02014b50)
version made by	2 bytes	
version needed to extract	2 bytes	
general purpose bit flag	2 bytes	
compression method	2 bytes	
last mod file time	2 bytes	
last mod file date	2 bytes	
cnc-32	4 bytes	
compressed size	4 bytes	
uncompressed size	4 bytes	
file name length	2 bytes	
extra field length	2 bytes	
file comment length	-	
0	2 bytes	
disk number start	2 bytes	
internal file attributes	2 bytes	
external file attributes	4 bytes	
relative offset of local header	4 bytes	
file name (variable size)		
extra field (variable size)		
file comment (variable size)		
,,		




Applying k-Means clustering

- Find and parse all available CD headers
- Convert the version/flags/method/timestamp fields into separate fields of an "observation" vector.
- Spread *k* markers randomly among distinct observations,
- Then move them iteratively until they each sit in the centre of clusters.
- Rough informal description of the algorithm:
 - 1. Assign all observations to their nearest marker
 - 2. Move the marker to the average of all its assigned observations.
 - 3. While marker movement > some small amount, GOTO 1



k-means clustering



Animation from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Chire

(our use case is 5-Dimensional and difficult to visualise usefully)



So now we've got our Central Directories

- Use the LFH relative offset for ordering.
- Each record generally created sequentially as the file is being built up
- Create a skeleton file for each zip file
- Start with moving the page for the first CD to where the EOCD indicates it should be
- Carry on for remaining CD pages finishing with the EOCD page.


File header:

central file header signature			(0x02014b50)
version made by	2	bytes	
version needed to extract	2	bytes	
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compression method	2	bytes	
last mod file time	2	bytes	
last mod file date	2	bytes	
cnc-32		bytes	
compressed size		bytes	
uncompressed size		bytes	
file name length	2	bytes	
extra field length		bytes	
file comment length		bytes	
disk number start	2	bytes	
internal file attributes		bytes	
external file attributes	4	bytes	
relative offset of local header		-	
file name (vaniable cize)			
file name (variable size)			
extra field (variable size)			
file comment (variable size)			




Where we are so far

- Any broken CD headers which spanned page boundaries are now recovered
- CD headers are densely packed and give a complete page ordering for central directory.






Building a file map






Finding matching file records

From the PKZip Specification





Known pages filled in





Ziprecover POC script in action

(Have actually re-implemented the whole thing in Rust to try and leverage the well known nom parser macro crate for convenient parser verification but introduced an unsolved perf bug recently which makes total runtime too long for demo comfort. Sorry)



- Can't fully recover any data segment bigger than twice page size (although thanks to the header data, up to the first 2 pages of compressed data can be unzipped nicely!).
- Worst case where LF headers bookend a page of pure compression data, lose a full file chunk (but will retrieve file data for the files before and after)
- I haven't made use of the CRC data yet to try and search for matching pages to fill gaps.
 - This would work pretty well for filling one-page gaps
 - However, combinatorics means even though CRC is cheap, testing it over many permutations of a file gets exponentially hard quickly for multi-page gaps, increasingly likely to see a CRC32 collision instead of the correct permutation of pages.
- Also still some implementation bugs
 - This is a massive shotgun parser and I'm not doing enough sanity checking during header parsing to prevent corruption artefacts creeping in and breaking it in all cases.
 - There are a lot of ways to get parsing of corrupted data wrong!



Thanks for listening.

Any Questions?

