



Hacking Cell Phone Embedded Systems

Keegan Ryan – RECON 2017





The Target


The Target



brendangates

The Target





Meriac (2010), Churchill

Legacy ICLASS

- Introduced in 2007
- Broken in 2010
 - Master key on every reader
 - Security of card reader broken
 - Protocol reverse
 engineered
- New version of iCLASS released, but many still use Legacy iCLASS
- Uses ISO15693




- CONTACTLESS COMMUNICATION
 - Carrier frequency: 13.56 MHz ±7 KHz.
 - Data rate : 26 kBit/s (ISO 15 693), 106 or
 - Data coding : User can configure :

Nexus S

- Introduced in 2010
- One of earliest to support NFC, including ISO15693
- Android source code available
- Cheap



Nexus S



- Try Android app first
- Transceive raw bytes

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- CRC added automatically, but we don't want a CRC
- Not added by libraries
- Not added by kernel
- Must be added by NFC controller chip

PN544

- Separate from Nexus S CPU
- Powered by host or external field
- Supports ISO 15693, Mifare, FeliCa
- Supports firmware upgrades
- Uses 80C51MX Processor







Investigating the PN544



Firmware Recovery

- PHDNLD CMD READ
- Pull from update file
- Code signing
 - Protected with SHA1 and RSA-1024
 - Introduced after first devices shipped

tree <u>08510355fb6f70462288c28e03fafc99ae9ee7e9</u> parent <u>df82c4dd7c6d5ad232b5628edf73aa9ea3f8c2c0</u> [diff]


Patch to add Secure Download Mechanism in the libnfc

This patch permit to support secure download update and also to avoid locking states in case of download failures

Change-Id: <u>198aa80976a67b18562ddcff4d085ed415dac4933</u>


Need a device never updated past Gingerbread

Libnfc-nxp



Reverse Engineering

- Look for strings. There aren't any.
- Look for CRC constants. They don't exist.
- Look for usage of the XOR instruction. No help.
- Just start reversing until we find something useful.



Reverse Engineering

- Reverse commonly called functions
- Find switch function
- Find command switching
- Trace known command IDs through code

Reverse Engineering

352
353
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/* ETSI HCI Specific RF Reader Gates */
phHciNfc_RFReaderAGate
phHciNfc_RFReaderBGate

/* Proprietary Reader Gate */
phHciNfc_IS015693Gate
phHciNfc_RFReaderFGate
phHciNfc_JewelReaderGate

/* ETSI HCI Card RF Gates */

phHciNfc_CETypeBGate phHciNfc_CETypeBPrimeGate phHciNfc_CETypeAGate phHciNfc_CETypeFGate

/* NFC-IP1 Gates */

phHciNfc_NFCIP1InitRFGate phHciNfc_NFCIP1TargetRFGate

	lcall	switch
	.word	
= 0x13.	.byte	
= 0x13,	.word	
= 0x11,	.byte	
0/111,	.word	
	.byte	
	.word	
	.byte	
= 0x12,	.word	
	byte	
= 0x14,	.word	
	.byte	
= 0x15,—	.word	
	.byte	
	.word	
	.byte	
	.word	
= 0x21,	.byte	
= 0x22,	.word	
- 0,222,	.byte	
= 0x23,		0x5B59
	byte	
= 0x24,		0x5B5B
	.byte	
		0x5B5D
	.byte	
	.word	
$= 0 \times 30$,	.byte	
- 0/21		0x5B63
= 0x31,	.byte	
		0x5B60
	.byte	
	.word	
	.word	
	; End of function swit	ch by ga:

seg002_805B0F:

acall

; CODE XREF: switch_by_gate+61j get_53h_GateID

.uyct 0x12 .word 0x5B4B .byte 0x13 .word 0x5B51 .byte 0x14 .word 0x5B53 .byte 0x15 .word 0x5B48 .byte 0x21 .word 0x5B48 .byte 0x22 .word 0x5B48 .byte 0x23 .word 0x5B59 .byte 0x23 .word 0x5B59 .byte 0x31 .word 0x5B5D .byte 0x90 .word 0x5B66 .byte 0x94 .word 0x5B66 .byte 0x86 .byte 0x86 .byte 0x86 .byte 0x86 .byte 0x94 .word 0x5B68 .byte 0x81 .word 0x5B87 End of function switch_by_gate

Problem:



FW_CODE

EEPROM/CFG

Problem: Missing Code

PATCH_TABLE

FW CODE

EEPROM/CFG

E -

???

Problem: Missing Code

PATCH_TABLE


FW CODE

EEPROM/CFG

A

KERNEL_CODE

- We understand and can modify FW CODE
- FW CODE doesn't have access to kernel
- We can modify PATCH CODE
- **Don't know how to trigger** PATCH_CODE
- Want to maximize chances of executing our code



Problem: Missing Code

PATCH_TABLE

FW CODE

KERNEL CODE

EEPROM/CFG

PATCH CODE

Problem: Missing Code

PATCH_TABLE

FW CODE

EEPROM/CFG

KERNEL CODE


Reverse Engineering Kernel

- Look for strings. Still aren't any.
- Look for CRC constants. Still don't exist.
- Look for usage of the XOR instruction. No help.
- CRC creation is done by hardware
- Still not impossible, but we need a new approach







Wireless Protocols



SDR Setup



SDR Setup



Transfer Speed

- ISO15693 has two modes:
 - Slow (1.65 kbps)
 - Fast (26.48 kbps)
- Nexus S uses slow mode
- ICLASS only uses fast mode


CONTACTLESS COMMUNICATION

- Carrier frequency: 13.56 MHz ±7 KHz.
- Data rate: 26 kBit/s (ISO 15 693) 106 or
- Data coding : User can configure :

Inside Contactless (2004)

Problem: Transfer Speed

- Capability probably exists, but is unused.
- Find transmission code
- Loads settings from
 EEPROM/CFG
- Only uses one set of values
- Swap around values in EEPROM/CFG
- Fast mode!



Mifare


case NXP_MIFARE_RAW:

{


```
case NXP_MIFARE_CMD:
```

Libnfc-nxp

Problem: Checksum Generation



Patching the Kernel







Exploitation



Patching Checksum Generation





Putting It All Together



FW CODE

EEPROM/CFG

KERNEL_CODE



Demo



Demo

Activities 🕟 Terminal 🔻	Sat 17:34●	o 🖬 🐠 🔓 🗸
	keegan@keegan-VirtualBox: ~/magic_demo	×
File Edit View Search Terminal Help		
keegan@keegan-VirtualBox: ~/magic_demo \$./run_demo.sh	

Future Research

What can be done with a hacked NFC controller?

- Surreptitiously read a badge
- Information storage
- Information exfiltration

Future Research


- What other embedded systems do we carry everywhere?
 - Bluetooth
 - USB controller
 - Baseband radio
 - Camera
 - Fingerprint reader
- What could you make these systems do?



The End

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Bypassing Firmware Signing?



Bibliography

Brendangates. "Badge reader." Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0). Accessed 11 June 2017. https://www.flickr.com/photos/brendangates/2384518688. Churchill, Sam. "nfc.phone." Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0). Accessed 11 June 2017. https://www.flickr.com/photos/samchurchill/5181496553 Inside Contactless. "Datasheet PicoPass 2KS." Rapport technique (2004). Libnfc-nxp Library. Accessed June 11, 2017. https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libnfc-nxp. Meriac, Milosch. "Heart of darkness-exploring the uncharted backwaters of hid iclass (TM) security." In 27th Chaos Communication Congress. 2010. NXP. "NXP NFC controller PN544 for mobile phones and portable equipment." On Line: http://www.nxp.com/documents/leaflet/75016890.pdf (2010). Wharton, John. "An Introduction to the Intel-MCS-51 Single-Chip

Microcomputer Family." Intel Corporation (1980).