

# Reversing FreeRTOS on embedded devices

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# About us - Vladan



- Senior Managing Security Consultant in IBM EMEA XFR team
- 20+ years of experience with electronics and IT
- Embedded development, reverse engineering and ethical hacking



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# Why?

- Recent project challenges
- Interesting findings
- We believe it will be useful for community to share


# From the desktop...

- Desktop Intel based platform is around for a very long time
- A lot of skills, tools and techniques developed for it
- 2 major flavors – x86 and x64 with some extensions(MMX, SSE, AVS...)
- Hardware is abstracted by OS and drivers



## ...To Embedded

- Usually around some micro CPU
- There are a lot of choices(PIC, AVR, Intel, MIPS, ESP...)
- Very common cores are ARM Cortex M0, M3 and M4 based
- Those devices comes with a lot of peripherals to support virtually any need
- Need to develop both hardware and software side







# Everywhere

- IoT devices are massively deployed
- Previously isolated devices becomes connected
- With expanded capabilities
- Like SCADA systems
- Even cars


# Tools of choice

- IDA Pro
- Capstone
- Hex editors




# IDA Pro for embedded

- Excellent tool... but with some quirks
- Firmware loading – custom loader or manual
- Incomplete disassembly
- Problem with modes and instructions



# Main constraints

- Limited amount of memory and resources
- Power consumption awareness
- Real time responses
- Self sustainable and resilient



# Common hardware issues

- JTAG & UART ports available
- Exposed busses (I<sup>2</sup>C, IIS, Serial)
- Unprotected external storages (FLASH, sdcard...)
- Unprotected radio interfaces (WiFi, Bluetooth, microwaves...)
- Debugging consoles left active
- Unprotected bootloader and fw updates
- Fuses not set to make internal flash unreadable

# Software Requirements

- Needs to be tailored to fit the hardware
- CPU speed, memory constrains, available storage
- Power consumption
- Error handling and bugs resilience
- Software developer needs to be versatile with the platform hardware developers designed.
  
- Common solution – choose some of numerous existing frameworks and RTOS which enables some level of hardware abstraction.

# Introducing Free RTOS

- Small and very lean RTOS developed by Real Time Engineers Ltd
- Free and open source environment (there is a commercial version)
- Runs on almost everything (30+ platform supported oob)
- Yes, even Arduino
- Easy to customize for new platforms
  - port.c, portasm.s and portmacro.h needs to be ported for a new platform
- Widely supported by open source community
- Preemptive and cooperative multitasking
- Tickles mode of operation supported
- Tiny footprint
- More details: [www.freertos.org](http://www.freertos.org)

# Supported high level functionalities

- Custom developed TCP and UDP IP stack
- FAT FS
- CLI
- I/O support including GPIO

# FreeRTOS Structure

User Code

FreeRTOS core

HW dependent code

Hardware

# FreeRTOS main components

- Task Scheduler
- Tasks
  - independent piece of code which runs in its own context and with a separate stack under the Task Scheduler
- Co-routines
  - Not commonly used. All co-routines share the same stack with prioritized cooperative multitasking
- Data queues
- Semaphores & Mutexes
- Timers

# Internals

- Heavily relies on double linked circular lists
- pxTaskReadyList contains a list of tasks that needs to be executed
- Every task has its own Task Control Block. TCB has a pointer to the stack allocated for the task.
- Queue is a list with additional pointers indicating where is the next read or write address.
- Semaphore is a specific instance of queue which doesn't track the data but the number of used elements in uxMessageWaiting field.
- Mutex is similar to semaphore, but head pointer is always 0 indicating it is a mutex and pointer to the task owning it is in the tail pointer.

```
typedef struct tskTaskControlBlock
{
    volatile StackType_t *pxTopOfStack; /*< Points to the location of

    #if ( portUSING_MPU_WRAPPERS == 1 )
        xMPU_SETTINGS xMPUSettings; /*< The MPU settings a
    #endif

    ListItem_t xStateListItem; /*< The list that the
    ListItem_t xEventListItem; /*< Used to re
    UBaseType_t uxPriority; /*< Th
    StackType_t *pxStack; /*< Po
    char pcTaskName[ configMAX_TASK_NAME_LEN ];

    #if ( portSTACK_GROWTH > 0 )
        StackType_t *pxEndOfStack; /*< Points to
    #endif

    #if ( portCRITICAL_NESTING_IN_TCB == 1 )
        UBaseType_t uxCriticalNesting; /*< Holds the
    #endif

    #if ( configUSE_TRACE_FACILITY == 1 )
        UBaseType_t uxTCBNumber; /*< Stores a n
        UBaseType_t uxTaskNumber; /*< Stores a n
    #endif
}
```

# Security Features overview

- By design, not much of them
- Since it is not designed as multitenant environment it lacks security controls we're used to on the desktop
- It supports:
  - Tasks with different privilege levels (only on ARM Cortex M3 with MPU enabled)
  - Stack overflow protection
  - SSL library as an add-on


# Security issues

- These are not real bugs in FreeRTOS, this is just observation from the point of adversary who wants to do some exploitation!
  - TCP/IP stack is not very resilient
  - Stack overflow protection is rudimentary
  - MPU usage is not very common (supported only on ARM M3 platforms anyway)
    - Unprivileged task can spawn privileged task, if MPU is used; or
    - Everything runs in the same context otherwise
  - It is developed in C inheriting all possible security problems as any other C programs (buffer overflows, heap corruptions...)


# Sample application

- Sample => simple
- Goals
  - Get the button state
  - Toggle the LED if button is pushed
- Idea is to create a simple firmware for a device which will have MCU, a button and a LED.
- When button is pressed, LED will change its state.

# Basic architecture



# Application architecture



# Initialize

```
int main( void ){

    /* Setup hardware */
    STM_EVAL_LEDInit( LED1 );
    STM_EVAL_PBInit( BUTTON_KEY, BUTTON_MODE_EXTI );

    /* Create Semaphore */
    vSemaphoreCreateBinary( xLedSemaphore );

    /* Create Tasks */
    xTaskCreate( xLedSemaphoreHandler, "LedSemaphoreHandlerTask",
configMINIMAL_STACK_SIZE, NULL, 3, NULL );

    /* Start Scheduler */
    vTaskStartScheduler();

    return 1;
}
```

# Run

```
// LED connected to GPIO port PC10
static void xLedSemaphoreHandler(void *pvParameters){
    for ( ;; ) {
        xSemaphoreTake( xLedSemaphore, portMAX_DELAY );
        STM_EVAL_LEDToggle( LED1 );
        //GPIOWriteBit(GPIOC,GPIOPin10,Bit_SET); // turn on LED
    }
}

// Button connected to GPIO port PB8
static void EXTI4_15_IRQHandler(void ){
    if( EXTI_GetITStatus( KEY_BUTTON_EXTI_LINE ) != RESET ) {
        long lHigherPriorityTaskWoken;
        lHigherPriorityTaskWoken = pdFALSE;
        xSemaphoreGiveFromISR ( xLedSemaphore,&lHigherPriorityTaskWoken );
        portEND_SWITCHING_ISR( lHigherPriorityTaskWoken );
        EXTI_ClearITPendingBit( KEY_BUTTON_EXTI_LINE );
    }
}
```

# From source to hardware

- Wire up the platform – button and led must be where expected
- Compile for the specific platform
- Upload resulting image to the target MCU
- On reset, led should remain off
- Push the button, led should lit
- Push the button again and led should shut
- With minor changes in imports and ensuring button and led are on known positions as defined we can compile for any other platform

# What is next?

- Now we have created our first embedded device
- ...
- Profit 😊



# Bad stuff will happen

- Somewhere in the world, dark forces are at works...
- Some people are trying to do some bad stuff to our valued product
- Since we made a hardware mistake, it was possible to dump the firmware from our device...



# Reverse engineering on embedded systems

The good thing about embedded systems firmware:

It is that it's deeply tied to the MCU

The bad thing about embedded systems firmware:

It is that it's deeply tied to the MCU

# Reverse engineering on Embedded

- String analysis does not help
- There are no syscalls on FreeRTOS
- There is no memory protection
- IDA by default will not detect the Entry point.

..... can we find the Entry point ?

**YES**

# The entry point

- STM32 has some default interrupts which are controlled by handlers.
- In order to know where is each handler there is table called Interrupt Vector Table, which holds the address for each interrupt.
- One of these interrupts is the reset.
- What is boot rather than a reset interrupt?!

# The entry point - Interrupt Vector Table (IVT)

This table contains the addresses of the routines that will handle some of the interrupts.

This table is located at offset 0x00.

Exception number	IRQ number	Vector	Offset
47	31	IRQ31	0xBC
.		.	.
.		.	.
.		.	.
18	2	IRQ2	0x48
17	1	IRQ1	0x44
16	0	IRQ0	0x40
15	-1	SysTick	0x3C
14	-2	PendSV	0x38
13		Reserved	
12			
11	-5	SVCall	0x2C
10			
9			
8			
7		Reserved	
6			
5			
4			
3	-13	HardFault	0x10
2	-14	NMI	0x0C
1		Reset	0x08
		Initial SP value	0x04
			0x00

# The entry point – IVT raw

- Contents of the 0x00 offset of a FreeRTOS image

```
ROM:08000000 ; Segment type: Pure code
ROM:08000000 AREA ROM, CODE, READWRITE, ALIGN=0
ROM:08000000 ; ORG 0x80000000
ROM:08000000 CODE32
ROM:08000000 DCD 0x20000438, 0x8002085, 0x8001C5F, 0x8001DC3, 0, 0
ROM:08000000 DCD 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
ROM:0800002C DCD locret_8001238+1
ROM:08000030 DCD 0, 0
ROM:08000038 DCD 0x80011FB, 0x8000001, 0x800216F, 0x800217B, 0x8002235
ROM:08000038 DCD 0x8002237, 0x8002239, 0x800223B, 0x800223D, 0x8001131
ROM:08000038 DCD 0x800223F, 0x8002241, 0x8002243, 0x8002245, 0x8002247
ROM:08000038 DCD 0x8002249, 0x800224B, 0x800224D, 0x800224F, 0x8002251
ROM:08000038 DCD 0
ROM:0800008C DCD 0x8002253, 0x8002255, 0x8002257, 0x8002259, 0x800225B
ROM:0800008C DCD 0x800225D, 0x800225F, 0x8002261, 0x8002263, 0x8002265
ROM:0800008C DCD 0
ROM:080000B8 DCD 0x8002267, 0
ROM:080000C0 CODE16
ROM:08000000
```

# The entry point – IVT decoded

- The plugin packs the data into a table format
- And adds the comment for what is reserved

```
ROM: 08000000
ROM: 08000004
ROM: 08000008
ROM: 0800000C
ROM: 08000010
ROM: 08000014
ROM: 08000018
ROM: 0800001C
ROM: 08000020
ROM: 08000024
ROM: 08000028
ROM: 0800002C
ROM: 08000030
ROM: 08000034
ROM: 08000038
ROM: 0800003C
ROM: 08000040
ROM: 08000044
ROM: 08000048
ROM: 0800004C
ROM: 08000050
ROM: 08000054
ROM: 08000058
ROM: 0800005C
ROM: 08000060
ROM: 08000064
ROM: 08000068
ROM: 0800006C
ROM: 08000070
ROM: 08000074
ROM: 08000078
ROM: 0800007C
ROM: 08000080
ROM: 08000084
ROM: 08000088
ROM: 0800008C
ROM: 08000090
ROM: 08000094
ROM: 08000098
ROM: 0800009C
ROM: 080000A0
ROM: 080000A4
ROM: 080000A8
ROM: 080000AC
```

```
DCD 0x20000438 ; Initial SP value
DCD 0x8002085 ; Reset Interrupt handler
DCD 0x8001C5F ; Non maskable interrupt handler
DCD 0x8001DC3 ; Hard Fault handler
DCD 0 ; Reserved
DCD 0x8001239 ; SVC_Handler
DCD 0 ; Reserved
DCD 0 ; Reserved
DCD 0x80011FB ; PendSV_Handler
DCD 0x8000001 ; SysTick_Handler
DCD 0x800216F ; Reserved
DCD 0x800217B ; all Interrupts
DCD 0x8002235 ; WWDG_IRQHandler
DCD 0x8002237 ; PVD_IRQHandler
DCD 0x8002239 ; RTC_IRQHandler
DCD 0x800223B ; FLASH_IRQHandler
DCD 0x800223D ; RCC_IRQHandler
DCD 0x8001131 ; EXTIReserved_1_IRQHandler
DCD 0x800223F ; EXTI2_3_IRQHandler
DCD 0x8002241 ; EXTI4_15_IRQHandler
DCD 0x8002243 ; TS_IRQHandler
DCD 0x8002245 ; DMA1_Channel1_IRQHandler
DCD 0x8002247 ; DMA1_Channel2_3_IRQHandler
DCD 0x8002249 ; DMA1_Channel4_5_IRQHandler
DCD 0x800224B ; ADC1_COMP_IRQHandler
DCD 0x800224D ; TIM1_BRK_UP_TRG_COM_IRQHandler
DCD 0x800224F ; TIM1_CC_IRQHandler
DCD 0x8002251 ; TIM2_IRQHandler
DCD 0 ; TIM3_IRQHandler
DCD 0x8002253 ; TIM6_DAC_IRQHandler
DCD 0x8002255 ; Reserved
DCD 0x8002257 ; TIM14_IRQHandler
DCD 0x8002259 ; TIM15_IRQHandler
DCD 0x800225B ; TIM16_IRQHandler
DCD 0x800225D ; TIM17_IRQHandler
DCD 0x800225F ; I2C1_IRQHandler
DCD 0x8002261 ; I2C2_IRQHandler
DCD 0x8002263 ; SPI1_IRQHandler
```

# The entry point – Reset Handler

```
ROM: 080273C4 ;  
ROM: 080273C4 LDR R0, =0x200007B0  
ROM: 080273C6 MSR.W MSP, R0  
ROM: 080273CA  
ROM: 080273CC LDR R1, [R0]  
ROM: 080273CE LSRS R1, R1, #0x18  
ROM: 080273D0 MOVS R2, #0x1F  
ROM: 080273D2 CMP R1, R2  
ROM: 080273D4 BNE loc_80273E2  
ROM: 080273D6 LDR R0, =0x40021018  
ROM: 080273D8 MOVS R1, #1  
ROM: 080273DA STR R1, [R0]  
ROM: 080273DC LDR R0, =0x40010000  
ROM: 080273DE MOVS R1, #0  
ROM: 080273E0 STR R1, [R0]  
ROM: 080273E2  
ROM: 080273E2 loc_80273E2 ; CODE XREF: ROM:080273D4↑j  
ROM: 080273E2 LDR R0, =(sub_8024ED8+1)  
ROM: 080273E4 BLX R0 ; sub_8024ED8  
ROM: 080273E6 LDR R0, =(loc_802C1E8+1)  
ROM: 080273E8 BX R0 ; loc_802C1E8  
ROM: 080273E8 ;
```

Now we have an entry point

# Reverse engineering on Embedded

- Now we have an entry point.
- all peripheral access is done by reading and writing into specific memory addresses.
  - Address ranges and offsets are mapped to the MCU buses.

..... so can these ranges and offsets be useful?

**YES**

# Reverse engineering on STM32F0

- The MCU documentation will contain the registers addresses and their functions.
- How does the plugin help?
- It:
  - Lists the registers manipulated
  - Lists functions that manipulate each register
  - Adds comments to the code with description of each register

# IDA Plugin - Registers descriptions

```
001DC4 08001DC4: SUB_8001DC4
#####
Registers and peripheral ranges in use from the MCU

0x40010008 [SYSCFG_EXTICR1] External interrupt configuration register 1
0x40022000 [FLASH_ACR] Flash access control register
0x40010414 [EXTI_PR] Pending register
0x4002102C address is not known
0x40021014 [RCC_AHBENR] AHB peripheral clock enable register
0x40021030 address is not known
0x40021034 address is not known
0x40021018 [RCC_APB2ENR] APB peripheral clock enable register 2
0x4001040C [EXTI_FTSR] Falling trigger selection register
0x40010408 [EXTI_RTSTR] Rising trigger selection register
0x40010400 [EXTI_IMR] Interrupt mask register
0x40010404 [EXTI_EMR] Event mask register
0x40021000 address is not known
0x40021000 [RCC_CR] Clock control register
0x40021004 [RCC_CFGR] Clock configuration register

#####
ARM/CPU Internal peripherals used by this firmware

0xE000ED04 [SCB:RW] Interrupt Control and State Register
0xE000E180 [NVIC:RW] NVIC Interrupt Clear-Enable register
0xE000E100 [NVIC:RW] NVIC Interrupt Set-Enable register
0xE000E010 [SYT:RW] SysTick Control and Status Register
0xE000E014 [SYT:RW] SysTick reload value register
0xE000E400 [NVIC:RW] Interrupt Priority Registers
0xE000ED20 [SCB:RW] System handler priority register 3
```

# IDA Plugin – Functions manipulating registers

```
#####  
# FUNCTIONS THAT HANDLE REGISTERS FROM THE MCU OR CPU          #  
# (double click on sub_ADDRESS to go to the code)              #  
#####
```

Functions that call CPU Internal peripherals

Function: sub\_8000D20

- > Register: 0xE000E014 [SYT:RW] SysTick reload value register
- > Register: 0xE000E010 [SYT:RW] SysTick Control and Status Register

Function: sub\_8001E20

- > Register: 0xE000E400 [NUI:RW] Interrupt Priority Registers
- > Register: 0xE000E400 [NUI:RW] Interrupt Priority Registers
- > Register: 0xE000E100 [NUI:RW] NVIC Interrupt Set-Enable register
- > Register: 0xE000E180 [NUI:RW] NVIC Interrupt Clear-Enable register

Function: sub\_80001E4

- > Register: 0xE000ED04 [SCB:RW] Interrupt Control and State Register

Function: sub\_8000C7E

- > Register: 0xE000ED20 [SCB:RW] System handler priority register 3
- > Register: 0xE000ED20 [SCB:RW] System handler priority register 3
- > Register: 0xE000ED20 [SCB:RW] System handler priority register 3
- > Register: 0xE000ED20 [SCB:RW] System handler priority register 3

```
#####
```

Functions changing SYSCONF + COMP registers

Function: sub\_8001DC4

- > Register: 0x40010008 [SYSCFG\_EXTICR1] External interrupt configuration register 1


```
#####
```

Functions accessing flash interface registers

Function: sub\_8001F06

- > Register: 0x40022000 [FLASH\_ACR] Flash access control register


# IDA Plugin – Comments on the code



```
#####
FUNCTIONS THAT HANDLE REGISTERS FROM THE MCU OR CPU      #
(double click on sub_ADDRESS to go to the code)         #
#####

unctions that call CPU Internal peripherals

unction: sub_8000D20
-> Register: 0xE000E014 [SYT:RW] SysTick reload value register
-> Register: 0xE000E010 [SYT:RW] SysTick Control and Status Register
unction: sub_8001E20
-> Register: 0xE000E400 [NUI:RW] Interrupt Priority Registers
-> Register: 0xE000E400 [NUI:RW] Interrupt Priority Registers
-> Register: 0xE000E100 [NUI:RW] NVIC Interrupt Set-Enable register
-> Register: 0xE000E180 [NUI:RW] NVIC Interrupt Clear-Enable register
unction: sub_8001E4
-> Register: 0xE000ED04 [SCB:RW] Interrupt Control and State Register
unction: sub_8000C7E
-> Register: 0xE000ED20 [SCB:RW] System handler priority register 3
-> Register: 0xE000ED20 [SCB:RW] System handler priority register 3
-> Register: 0xE000ED20 [SCB:RW] System handler priority register 3
-> Register: 0xE000ED20 [SCB:RW] System handler priority register 3
```



# Reverse engineering on STM32F0

- Generically RTOS need to define critical code areas where the interrupts cannot break the execution flow.
- This is done by using the ARM CPSID and CPSIE instructions.
- So a good place to start looking in your code is before CPSIE instruction.

# Critical code decoding and listing

The screenshot displays the IDA Pro interface with several windows open. The main window, 'IDA View-A', shows the assembly code for function 'sub\_80001E4'. The code is as follows:

```
; FUNCTION CHUNK AT 08000CB0 SIZE 00000008 BYTES
PUSH    {R4,LR}
MOVS    R4, R0
BL      loc_8000CC4
LDR     R0, =dword_20001EF4
LDR     R0, [R0]
ADDS    R0, R0, #1
LDR     R1, =dword_loc_8000CC4
STR     R0, [R1]
LDR     R0, =dword_
LDR     R0, [R0]
CMP     R0, #0
BNE     loc_8000210
```

Below the main code, there are three callout windows showing further code:

- CPSID I** (highlighted in red):

```
LDR     R0, =dword_20000004
LDR     R0, [R0]
ADDS    R0, R0, #1
LDR     R1, =dword_20000004
STR     R0, [R1]
```
- loc\_8000210**:

```
LDR     R0, =dword_20001F00
LDR     R0, [R0]
CMP     R0, #0
BNE     loc_8000228
```
- Two windows showing code at **loc\_8000228**:

```
LDR     R0, =dword_20001EE4
STR     R4, [R0]
LDR     R0, =dword_20001EF4
LDR     R0, [R0]
CMP     R0, #1
BNE     loc_8000228
```

```
LDR     R0, [R4, #0x2C]
LDR     R1, =dword_20001EE4
LDR     R1, [R1]
LDR     R1, [R1, #0x2C]
CMP     R0, R1
BCC     loc_8000228
```

The 'Output window' at the bottom shows the following text:

```
loading processor module C:\pro...
loading type libraries...
autoanalysis subsystem has been
database for file 'RTOSDemo.bin
compiling file 'C:\Program File
executing function 'main'...

Python 2.7.12 (v2.7.12:d33e0cf9
IDAPython v1.7.0 final (serial

Starting the search for periphe
Critical Functions
function: sub_8000CDC
-> sub_80001E4
-> sub_8000210
-> sub_8000600
```

The 'Function name' list on the left includes:

- sub\_800140C
- sub\_800155C
- sub\_800160C
- sub\_80016A0
- sub\_8001810
- sub\_80018AE
- sub\_80018DE
- sub\_800194C
- sub\_80019CF

The status bar at the bottom indicates: 100.00% (200,33) (234,131) 000001E8 080001E8: sub\_80001E4+4 (Synchronized with Hex View-1)

# Critical code decoding and listing

The screenshot displays the Immunity Debugger interface with the following components:

- Function List:** A list of functions including `sub_80016A0`, `sub_8001810`, `sub_80018AE`, `sub_80018DE`, `sub_800194C`, and `sub_80019C5`.
- Graph Overview:** A control flow graph showing the execution path between various code blocks.
- Output Window:** A log showing the execution of a Python script. The log includes messages such as "loading processor module", "loading type libraries...", "autoanalysis subsystem has been initialized", "database for file 'RTOSDemo.bin' created", "compiling file 'C:\Program Files\Python\python.exe'", "executing function 'main'", and "starting the search for peripheral devices".
- Assembly Windows:** Several windows showing assembly code with control flow arrows indicating the execution path:
  - loc\_8000248:** Contains assembly instructions: `ADDS R1, R4, #4`, `LDR R0, =0x20001D9C`, `LDR R2, [R4, #0x2C]`, `MOVS R3, #0x14`, `MULS R2, R3`, `ADDS R0, R0, R2`, `BL sub_8000BD0`, `BL sub_8000CDC` (highlighted with a red box), `LDR R0, =dword_20001F00`, `LDR R0, [R0]`, `CMP R0, #0`, and `BEQ locret_8000274`.
  - loc\_8000CB0:** Contains assembly instructions: `LDR R0, =dword_20001EE4`, `LDR R0, [R0]`, `LDR R0, [R0, #0x2C]`, `LDR R1, [R4, #0x2C]`, `CMP R0, R1`, and `BCS locret_8000274`.
  - locret\_8000274:** Contains assembly instructions: `POP {R4, PC}` and a comment: `; End of function sub_80001E4`.

The status bar at the bottom shows the current address: `100.00% (119,1074) (418,556) 000001F0 080001F0: sub_80001E4+C (Synchronized with Hex View-1)`.

# Interesting registers

- External interrupts where activated using SYSCFGEXT register.
- External interrupts are manipulated using EXTI registers
- Clock source and reload values configured using the SysTick registers
  - Used on all kind of timers if the clock is given by the CPU
- Nested Vector Interrupt control can be clear or set using the NVI registers
- Real Clock Controller can be manipulated with the RCC registers
  - crucial for input/output operations on peripherals

# Interesting registers

```
#####  
# FUNCTIONS THAT HANDLE REGISTERS FROM THE MCU OR CPU      #  
# (double click on sub_ADDRESS to go to the code)         #  
#####
```

Functions that call CPU Internal peripherals

```
Function: sub_8000D20  
-> Register: 0xE000E014 [SYT:RW] SysTick reload value register  
-> Register: 0xE000E010 [SYT:RW] SysTick Control and Status Register  
Function: sub_8001E20  
-> Register: 0xE000E400 [NVI:RW] Interrupt Priority Registers  
-> Register: 0xE000E400 [NVI:RW] Interrupt Priority Registers  
-> Register: 0xE000E100 [NVI:RW] NVIC Interrupt Set-Enable register  
-> Register: 0xE000E180 [NVI:RW] NVIC Interrupt Clear-Enable register  
Function: sub_80001E4  
-> Register: 0xE000ED04 [SCB:RW] Interrupt Control and State Register  
Function: sub_8000C7E  
-> Register: 0xE000ED20 [SCB:RW] System handler priority register 3  
-> Register: 0xE000ED20 [SCB:RW] System handler priority register 3  
-> Register: 0xE000ED20 [SCB:RW] System handler priority register 3  
-> Register: 0xE000ED20 [SCB:RW] System handler priority register 3
```

```
#####  
Functions changing SYSCONF + COMP registers
```

```
Function: sub_8001DC4  
-> Register: 0x40010008 [SYSCFG_EXTICR1] External interrupt configuration register 1
```

```
#####  
Functions accessing flash interface registers
```

```
Function: sub_8001F06  
-> Register: 0x40022000 [FLASH_ACR] Flash access control register
```

```
#####  
Functions accessing exti registers
```

```
Function: sub_8001ACA  
-> Register: 0x40010414 [EXTI_PR] Pending register  
Function: sub_8001A14  
-> Register: 0x4001040C [EXTI_FTSR] Falling trigger selection register  
-> Register: 0x40010400 [EXTI_IMR] Interrupt mask register  
-> Register: 0x40010408 [EXTI_RTSTR] Rising trigger selection register  
-> Register: 0x40010404 [EXTI_EMRR] Event mask register  
Function: sub_8001A9E  
-> Register: 0x40010414 [EXTI_PR] Pending register  
-> Register: 0x40010400 [EXTI_IMR] Interrupt mask register
```

```
#####  
Functions accessing rcc registers
```

```
Function: sub_8001E98  
-> Register address not known: 0x40021030  
-> Register address not known: 0x40021034  
-> Register address not known: 0x4002102C  
-> Register address not known: 0x40021008  
-> Register: 0x40021000 [RCC_CR] Clock control register  
-> Register: 0x40021004 [RCC_CFGR] Clock configuration register  
Function: sub_8001CDC  
-> Register: 0x40021018 [RCC_APB2ENR] APB peripheral clock enable register 2  
Function: sub_8001CBC  
-> Register: 0x40021014 [RCC_AHBENR] AHB peripheral clock enable register  
Function: sub_8001F06  
-> Register: 0x40021000 [RCC_CR] Clock control register  
-> Register: 0x40021004 [RCC_CFGR] Clock configuration register
```

# Future work

- Implement heuristics to find registers dynamically addressed
- Automatically re-analyse the interrupt handlers based on the decoded IVT
- Comment calls that will ReEnable Interrupts
- Improve analysis on registers manipulation and identification
- Identification of the Realtime operating system



**THANK YOU**

